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Abstract. Trust is important for development but can be hard to build.  In this 
paper, we report on experiments designed to understand the determinants of 
trust in villages in eastern Uganda, and in particular whether trust can be 
‘built’ by offering insurance to people as a protection against the possibility 
that the trust they offer will not be reciprocated. We find, firstly, that the effects 
of income and wealth on trust are ambiguous: trust is higher in the richer than 
the poorer village, but once association and female education are added as 
explanatory variables, the wealth effect disappears. Secondly, although the 
offer of insurance is taken up by a majority of players, this is in most cases not 
an ‘effective demand’ in the sense of incentivising higher levels of trust. 
Effective demand for insurance, defined in this way, however responds 
positively to high levels of risk efficacy, microfinance membership and female 
education. Insurance offered in this form, therefore, is by no means a reliable 
technology for building trust; but its effectiveness as a trust-building 
instrument appears to increase if certain complementary institutions are in 
position. 
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1. Introduction 
Trust is valuable, notably in low and middle income countries where its 
absence may lead into a lethal vicious circle of impoverishment
1; but unlike 
physical and indeed human capital, it cannot be bought in any market. How 
then can it be created? 
Experimental games between human beings have been quite widely used to 
demonstrate the existence of trust even in low-income communities, but they 
have not yet tackled the problem of how to bring it into being, other than by 
the standard social-capital route of facilitating association within networks. 
The global set of experiments from fifteen developing countries reported in 
Henrich et al. (2000)  between them fundamentally undermine the axioms of  
the self-interested Rational Economic Man
2, but do not speculate concerning 
how the more altruistic rationality which they discover shrinks and expands – 
or could be made to expand. But in principle the possibility for understanding 
this exists, either by correlating the levels of trust which are discovered with 
their potential causes, or by varying the experimental procedure so as to 
provide incentives to higher trust. In this paper, we adopt both approaches. 
The point of departure is provided by a trust experiment originally carried out 
by Abigail Barr, who modified the original Henrich procedures for use in 
Zimbabwe. Specifically,  Barr’s trust game (Barr 2003) is adapted for the 
conditions of Zimbabwean villages from a prototype developed by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe(‘BDM’,1995) whose purpose was to study the 
determinants of willingness by individuals to make investments in others; both 
authors use the game to study the influence of experience of social interaction 
on trust. The structure of the trust game is very simple: individuals play in 
pairs selected by the experimenter. Within each pair, player 1 is allocated a 
stake, of  which s/he can if she chooses invest a proportion in the other 
player, whose identity is not known to her. The amount invested by the first 
player is then tripled and handed over to the second player. The second 
player then decides whether she wishes to hand anything back to the first 
player. That is the end of the game. Because the game is as short as this and 
because players do not know who they are playing with, there is no possibility 
for people’s reputations or knowledge of one another to contaminate the 
results. All first players who venture an investment in the other player are 
aware that they are open to exploitation by that player, but also that they are 
                                                 
1 Some of the starkest claims made for social capital relate to the recent experience of 
recession and perestroika in Russia, in which, it has been alleged, ‘those who have access to 
social capital get ahead; those who do not get sick  and die’ (Kennedy et al 1998: 2039). 
2 ‘The canonical model (i.e. that individuals are entirely self-interested) is not supported in 
any society studied. Second, there is considerably more behavioural variability across groups 
than had been found in previous cross-cultural research, and the canonical model fails in a 
wider variety of ways than in previous experiments’ (Henrich et al. 2000:73) 
 
   3




2. Replication of the ‘trust game’ 
 The trust experiments: design 
  The data for this study are from Uganda, a country with similar per 
capita GDP to, although a very different historical background and productive 
structure to, Zimbabwe; and were collected In August 2003 from fifteen 
groups of twelve or thirteen  people (a total sample size of 186) in two villages 
on which we already hold extensive data on economic characteristics, risk 
attitudes and social histories (Horrell et al 2003) which potentially might offer 
insight into the correlates and determinants of trust . Salient features of these 
villages, Sironko and Bufumbo, are reported in Table 1:   4
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the research locations 
 Sironko  Bufumbo 
Height above sea level  1100m 1600m 
Type of agricultural land   Lowlands at the foot of Mount Elgon, 
marshy plain in the South, savannah 
grassland in the North, few volcanic 
soils  
Highlands on the slopes of Mount 
Elgon, volcanic soils 
Agricultural calendar: 
       Major rains  
       Major harvest 
       Minor rains 











Average rainfall  1580mm/year 2168mm/year 
Population size  6400 15285 
Population density  300/km
2  550/km
2 
Casual agricultural labourers (% of 
population) 
27.3% 1.3% 
Main crops  Bananas, maize, groundnuts, beans  Bananas, maize, beans, coffee, 
tomatoes, cabbages, onions 
Typical plot size  2-3 acres (see further Table 7.  )  1-2 acres (see further table 7.  ) 
Large farms (>20 acres)  5% 0% 
Average household income (monthly 
per equivalent adult) 
Sh 83039($43)  Sh 43492($22) 
Tribes  Iteso (immigrants from Kumi) and 
Bugisu (indigenous) 
Bugisu (also called Bamasaba in 
Bufumbo) 
Religion  Predominantly Christian (Catholic, 
Protestant, pentecostal) 
Islam(80-90%) 
Roads  Good quality tarred motor road south 
to Mbale and north to Kapchorwa, 
poor quality dirt roads otherwise 
Dirt roads, often steep, four-wheel 
drive only in bad weather 
Schools  One secondary school, four primary 
schools 
One secondary school, eight primary 
schools 
Clinics  Two private health centres in 
Sironko.  
 
Electricity  85% 0% 
Extension services  Uganda National Farmers’ 
Association, Mbale (not very active 
in Sironko) 
Uganda National Farmers’ 
Association, Mbale (very active in 
Bufumbo)   5
Non-agricultural employment 
opportunities 
Trade, hotels and bars in trading 
centre, ginnery, processing plant for 
maize, abattoir, mechanics 
Trade (mostly in Mbale town), 
beekeeping 
Access to credit  Centenary Bank (individual loans) 
PRIDE, FOCCAS (group micro-
credit for women) 
 
Restricted access to credit. Group 
microcredit only (Centenary Bank 
has withdrawn) 
 
Source: Muzaki 1998; background reports compiled on request by Mbale local government 
officers. Particular thanks to Patrick Natanga (formerly extension officer in Bufumbo) 
 
Within these settings, we organised eight sessions of the trust game involving 
67 pairs of players (33 in Sironko and 34 in Bufumbo)
3. The Bufumbo 
sessions were on Wednesday 27 and the Sironko sessions on Thursday 28 
August, 2003. As previously explained,  the identity of each Player 1 was 
secret to each Player 2 and vice versa, and all players were mandated to 
inform nobody, not even their families, how they had played. A full rubric for 
the games we organised is provided in the appendix to this paper. 
  Table 2 presents an overall picture of the decisions of first and second 
players in our trust game in relation to those designed by BDM in the United 
States and by Barr in Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
3 A remaining 52 members of the sample (26 pairs) played an ‘insurance game’, a modification of the 
trust game, on which we report below.   6
 
Table 2 Trust game: Responses by first and second players in the 
United States, Zimbabwe and Uganda 
 
  US: Berg et al. 1995  Zimbabwe: Barr 2003 Uganda: This study 
Number of playing 
pairs 
32 141  67 
Initial endowment 
size 
10 US $  20 Zimbabwe dollars  4000 Ugandan 
shillings (c.$2) 
Proportion of first 
players who invested 
zero 
0.06 0.09 0.07 
Mean investment for 
first players 
5.16US$  8.58 Zim$  0.9 US$ 
Mean investment as 
proportion of stake 
0.52 0.43 0.49 
Mean response 
(expressed as a 
proportion of 
investment) 
0.89 1.28 0.99 
We can first of all report, almost routinely, that trust is alive and well in 
Eastern Uganda as in the locations of the other surveys reported by Hemrich 
et al –. Both the mean investment of first players (49% of the available stake) 
and the mean response by second players (99% of the first player’s initial 
investment) are in between those observed by Barr in Zimbabwe and those 
observed by BDM in the United States. 
 
Determinants of trust 
In seeking to understand the determinants of trust, BDM and Barr both use 
the trust game to investigate the influence of ’social history’ on trust – in the 
Barr case by comparing first and second player responses as between 
communities who had lived together a long time and communities which were 
recently resettled and thus lacked a social history. Our own interest is at this 
stage focussed on the influence not only of social history but specifically of the 
experience of poverty – since if that inhibits the formation of social relations 
that is an additional twist in the spiral – and also of policy variables which may 
incentivise mutual trust, and in particular insurance. A fuller discussion of 
trust-building is provided by Mosley et al.(2003), chapter 6.   7
 Our point of departure is the distinct patterns of response which are 
observable within the Uganda sample as between the richer village (Sironko) 
and the poorer village (Bufumbo), as portrayed in Table 3. In Sironko, people 
are more trusting, and their responses cluster around a modal interaction in 
which the first player invests Sh2000, and the second player reciprocally gives 
back also Sh 2000, or one-third of this amount tripled.  In Bufumbo, the poorer 
village, people are less trusting and their responses cluster around a modal 
interaction in which the first player invests Sh1000, and the second player 
reciprocally gives back also Sh 1000, or one-third of this amount tripled. In 
Bufumbo first players are much more willing to insure themselves against the 
possibility of being exploited by the second player, in a manner to be 
described later in the paper.   8
Table 3. Sironko and Bufumbo: initial conditions and behaviour in the 
trust game 







Initial conditions      
Risk efficacy 
(assets) index 




2.45 2.89 1.90 3.12*** 
(0.002) 
Mean income per 
equivalent adult  
(Ushs; 1$ = 1,850 
Ushs) 





of Sh4000 initial 
stake) (N = 134 or 
67 pairs of players) 
    
Player 1(s)  0.49 0.54 0.44 1.69* 
(0.096) 
Player 2(r)  0.47 0.78 0.26 5.02*** 
(0.000) 
Proportional 
response(r/s) for all 
si > 0 
0.99 1.43 0.66 5.27*** 
(0.000) 
Source: trust experiments 27 and 28 August; for interview protocol see Appendix. 
.  All this points to a possibility that higher levels of income may be not 
only (as argued for example by Narayan and Pritchett (1999) a consequence 
of higher levels of trust but also a cause of them.  Indeed, although what 
matters for risk-aversion, on the analysis of Mosley et al (2003), is 
vulnerability, what appears to matter for trust, on the basis of the prima facie 
evidence presented in Table 3, is income, which along with land-holdings is 
the key discriminator between the two villages. Average vulnerability is not 
very different between the two villages; essentially, as illustrated by Table 1, 
Sironko is a more developed and differentiated economy, with, in particular, a 
much larger underclass of casual, extremely vulnerable unskilled labourers,   9
and as a consequence its average vulnerability score is marginally higher 
than Bufumbo’s, even though average levels of income and landholding are 
also much higher. 
In order to better understand the various influences bearing on trust, we 
consider the following determinants of trusting and trustworthy behaviour in a 
regression analysis. 
•  Measures of well-being, in particular income and physical assets. 
As we have noted, Narayan and Pritchett (1999) assume that the 
link between trust and income is exclusively one from trust to 
income. By contrast, our experimentally obtained data, in which 
income and assets are in effect pre-determined variables (see 
below), allow us to isolate a direction of influence the other way 
about. 
•  Measures of human capital. That education helps to create social 
capital is a finding so far mainly examined and confirmed in 
industrialised countries. Appleton (2001) quantifies the individual 
return on education for Uganda. In a portfolio model of capital 
accumulation, human and social capital are likely to be 
complementary: it pays more to invest in networks when one’s level 
of education gives access to more rewarding employment 
opportunities (Glaeser et al. 2002). There may therefore be an 
important indirect payoff from the enormous investment put into 
schooling by the Ugandan government in recent years. 
•  Measures of association. The large database on our subjects 
compiled in the two years preceding the experiments on which we 
currently report contains various indicators of the degree in which 
households and individuals are linked with other households and 
individuals and with society at large. The indicator most relevant for 
our present purposes is a measure of bonding social capital. It 
captures the number, nature and intensity of reciprocal links 
between households. For details of its construction see Horrell et al. 
(2003). 
•  Measures of incentivised trust. A reasonable expectation of 
reciprocity – Player 1’s expectation of Player 2’s response – would 
increase the likelihood of trusting behaviour. We will explain below 
in what way we consider this reasonable expectation to be formed 
by determinants from the previous three categories. By contrast, in 
the next section we examine what happens to trust and trustworthy 
behaviour when, through an external intervention, a guarantee of 
reciprocity is substituted for a reasonable expectation. 
Econometric identification in this type of analysis requires careful estimation. 
With social capital (trusting and trustworthy behaviour; intensity of 
association) and ‘effort’ (risk-taking and thence income, expenditures and 
assets) contemporaneously determined, recovering model parameters is 
seldom achieved (cf. Durlauf 2002). However, experimentally obtained data   10
permit a convenient short-cut (cf. Glaeser et al. 2000). Subjects’ outside-the-
laboratory circumstances and characteristics, though still as a matter of 
course influencing their behaviour once inside the laboratory, become fully 
contextual, therefore pre-determined, and may be treated as exogenous for 
estimation purposes
4. But the short-cut should not be taken too hastily. Whilst 
trustworthy (Player 2) behaviour responds to a known initiative, trusting 
(Player 1) behaviour second-guesses a response. Player 1’s beliefs about 
Player 2’s secret preferences for reciprocity will in part be based on levels of 
actual reciprocity she has observed in her village, and in part – because the 
experiment is unlike anything she has ever experienced in her village – on her 
knowledge of what she herself would do in secret: in other words, trusting 
behaviour is in part a projection of one’s own trustworthiness (cf. Orbell and 
Dawes 1993), and in part the sort of leap of faith required when ‘mere 
prediction’ is an inadequate basis for action (cf. Lewis and Weigert 1985: 970, 
976). Econometrically this boils down to using the coefficients obtained from a 
regression of Player 2 behaviour in order to form an empirical analogue of the 
unobserved Player 1’s expectation of Player 2 behaviour. Trust in the sense 
of ‘projecting one’s own trustworthiness’ is then imputed by inserting Player 1 
characteristics (naturally apart from her actual offer) into the Player 2 
regression equation: this exercise tells us what our model predicts a typical 
Player 1 with precisely these characteristics would do if she were in Player 2’s 
shoes. The regression of Player 1 behaviour then becomes a second-stage 
regression with as its only argument the expectation of reciprocity constructed 
as just described, an expectation which itself depends on the individual-
specific determinants of trustworthy behaviour that we have postulated. 
Trusting behaviour in the sense of ‘a leap of faith exceeding mere prediction’ 
corresponds with the (positive) residuals that this regression implies. 
Table 4 reports the results of this regression analysis, with the first player offer 
(s), the second player response (r) and the ratio of the two (r/s), as in the Barr 
analysis, as dependent variables. Contrary to what we had surmised when 
comparing Bufumbo and Sironko in Table 3, income and assets now appear, 
once associational social capital and education are held constant, as negative 
influences on trustworthy behaviour and therefore, through Player 1’s 
expectation of Player 2’s behaviour – itself significantly positive – as a 
negative influence on trusting behaviour. This evidence on its own does not 
permit one to conclude that one success factor in becoming rich in this society 
is a willingness to take advantage of others, but nor is such a reading of the 
evidence ruled out. Our measure of bonding social capital, as expected, is a 
positive influence on trust and reciprocity, and so is female education (but not 
male education – tried but not reported on here). It is possible that female 
education proxies for a social capital indicator that captures membership of 
self-help groups: educated women tend to belong to these more often. When 
we included both female education and a self-help group membership dummy 
neither was significant, and when we included this dummy on its own, it was 
significant. Because of our priors we report female education in the table. The 
                                                 
4 The downside of the de facto exogeneity of certain choice variables is that experimentally obtained 
trust data are not particularly suitable for explaining the formation of associations. In Section 4 we 
therefore complement the analysis with questionnaire-based trust data – which of course come with 
their own limitations (cf. Glaeser et al. 2000).    11
difference between Bufumbo and Sironko that we noted in a more superficial 
comparison in Table 3 survives a more rigorous comparison: the coefficient 
on the Bufumbo = 1 dummy is large and hugely significant.   12
 
Table 4. Correlates of trust: regression analysis 
 
  Dependent variable and estimation method 


























































































2  0.117   0.592  0.620  0.474  0.489   13
N 67   67  67  67  67 
Source: data from trust experiments, August 2003, in association with Uganda database.  
Note: the variable ‘Player 1 expectation of Player 2 response’ is computed as: 1982.7 – 
2207.4*(Bufumbo =1; Sironko = 0) – 0.005*(monthly income per equivalent adult) + 
352.4*(bonding social capital) + 1321.5*(female education), inserting Player 1 characteristics 
into the best-performing Player 2 regression. For details of and the rationale behind this 
procedure see the text. 
 
 
3. The ‘insurance game’ 
 
Many of these apparent determinants of trust are not easy for policy-
makers or outside authorities to influence, and it is therefore natural to look for 
expedients which might augment people’s degree of trust. One obvious 
possibility is insurance: if first players were protected in some way against the 
possibility of exploitation by the second player, they might have more 
incentive to invest in her, and such protection is what insurance, in principle, 
provides. Accordingly, for some groups of players (who did not play the trust 
game and are kept separate from those who do) we modify the Barr/BDM 
game into an insurance game: first players are told that if and only if they 
commit to investing Sh1000 or more in the other player, they can lay off some 
of the potential loss by paying a Sh 1000 premium to an ‘insurance company’ 
(the administration of the game), in the event that any amount invested in the 
second player and not returned is guaranteed to come back to them – net, of 
course, of the insurance premium. The existence of an insurance facility thus 
potentially acts as an incentive to first players to increase their trust in others
5, 
much as tax exemptions are used to incentivise charitable donations. Does 
this form of incentive work in practice? 
The initial results, as illustrated in table 5, are unexpected and somewhat 
depressing. There is plenty of willingness to insure, but across the sample as 
a whole, greater trust (in the sense of first-player offers) is shown by those 
who are not offered insurance!  For anyone whose purpose is to incentivise 
mutual trust it is important to understand this paradox. 
                                                 
5 Note that if the first player chooses to buy insurance s/he sacrifices not only a ‘tax’ on gains, in the 
shape of the insurance premium, but also the possibility of maximum gains, since it is no longer 
possible to invest the maximum stake of Sh 4000 in the second player – Sh 1000 must be sacrificed to 
pay the insurance premium.   14
 
Table  5. Insurance game: the impact of insurance (first player offers as 
a proportion of initial stake).  
 
  Overall Sironko  Bufumbo 
Pure trust game (no 
insurance available) 
N = 134 (67 pairs of 
players) 
0.49 0.54 0.44 
Insurance game 
(insurance available) 
N = 104 (52 pairs of 
players) 
0.43  0.51 0.34 















Insurance game background data: 
Number of players: 104 individuals, 52 pairs of players: 26 in Sironko, 26 in Bufumbo 
Takers of insurance: 52% in Sironko, 82 % in Bufumbo 
First players offering zero: 5.9 % 
 
Again we begin the search for a solution by making the contrast between the 
‘less developed’ and the ‘more developed’ village. We observe that in the 
poorer village, Bufumbo, the demand for insurance is higher but what may be 
called the effective demand (its ability to elicit higher levels of trust in the 
players) is lower, with player 1 offers in the presence of insurance being 
considerably and significantly lower than what they are in its absence: so in 
Bufumbo, by contrast with Sironko, the offer of insurance appears to act as a 
perverse incentive. Is it poverty, or risk-aversion or some descriptive effect 
which is bringing this about? Note first that once insurance is taken out, less is 
available for Player 1 investment (cf. footnote 5 above). In the second place, 
incentivising trust gives rise to complex motivational dilemmas with possibly 
detrimental effects for the society’s moral fabric (cf. Titmuss 1970), for 
example as follows. At a superficial glance it would appear that the rational 
strategy for a Player 1 who has taken out insurance is to invest the full   15
remainder (Sh 3,000) of his initial endowment, since this can be done without 
taking any risks. However, such a strategy acts as a signal to Player 2 that 
probably insurance has been taken out, and that therefore she need not 
return any of the money offered. By investing Sh 3,000 Player 1 therefore 
reduces the likelihood that she will obtain a return on her investment rather 
than just her money back. By implication, Player 2, guessing that Player 1 
may well reason like this, may even interpret a lower offer as an albeit weaker 
signal that probably insurance has been taken out
6. Moreover, as is routinely 
found in ultimatum games (Guth and Tietz 1990, Roth et al. 1991, Henrich 
2000), subjects dislike being taken advantage of to such an extent that they 
tend to forfeit even certainties of individual gain when this implies a perceived 
unfair distribution of gains among players. The notion that Player 2 may free-
ride on her taking out insurance may therefore further suppress Player 1’s 
offer. The risk of exploitation is much higher in Bufumbo than in Sironko: 
approximately 30% of Players 2 in Bufumbo and less than 5% in Sironko 
returned zero, both in the trust game and in the insurance game. The 
similarity of these percentages across the two games suggests that Players 1 
have overall been effective in avoiding signalling that they had taken out 
insurance. The way giving this signal was avoided in Sironko was that all 
Players 1(100%) who took out insurance offered Sh 2,000 to Player 2. In 
Bufumbo 50% of Players 1 who had taken out insurance only offered Sh 
1,000! All the others offered 2,000, with one brave exception offering 3,000, 
who, true to form, was duly returned zero by his Player 2 counterpart. All of 
this suggests that the ability of insurance to elicit trusting behaviour is 
particularly tricky in a context in which the hazard one is insured against is 
other people’s non-cooperation, and that insurance may crowd out people’s 
pure preferences for altruism and reciprocal behaviour (cf. Titmuss 1970). 
In Table 6, we therefore run regressions with ‘effective demand’, our measure 
of the leverage of insurance (the player 1 offer in the insurance game, net of 
the average player 1 offer in the absence of insurance) as the dependent 
variable. Income and assets, as we had surmised, are weakly significant 
influences on insurance leverage – the offer of insurance only begins to elicit 
higher levels of trust once a certain income threshold is crossed
7. But, 
interestingly, social capital in the sense of associational membership detracts 
from and does not add to the effectiveness of insurance. As illustrated by the 
bar chart of Figure 1, those individuals who were most strongly incentivised by 
insurance had very few associational memberships, whereas those who were 
strongly networked often had many. Interviews with the ‘outliers’ strongly 
supported the initial impression that (experimentally offered) insurance and 
(actual) social capital might be acting as substitutes for one another. 
Respondent 235, for example (who appears as a highly incentivised outlier on 
Figure 1), told us, ‘I can only be trusting if I know there is an [insurance] 
organisation behind me, because I cannot rely on any [informal] association to 
                                                 
6 These considerations are not far-fetched. Anyone supposing that illiterate and semi-literate small 
farmers in a poor-country context do not engage in such mind games would be mistaken: from the 
debriefing interviews we know that our subjects reasoned precisely along these lines (Paul: Sara told 
me this when we phoned her from your office). 
7 Indeed, effective demand for insurance appears to be kinked (Figure 2 below) – there is very little 
demand for it at low levels of income.   16
protect me (interview 28.08.03;emphasis added). The implication would 
appear to be, firstly, that one cannot rely on insurance as a magic lubricant for 
markets which have seized up to break into the vicious circle of poverty – 
even if the pent-up demand for it is considerable, it would not appear to 
automatically increase trust and investment rates, particularly among the 
poor. And secondly, the effectiveness of this lubricant is apparently 
diminished and not increased by high levels of social capital – which, in a 
way, can be seen as a substitute for formal insurance.  




Figure 2: mean values of insurance-induced trust by income category 
Respon-
dent 235   17
 










Dependent variable: ‘insurance effectiveness’ (player 1 offer under 
insurance, less mean of player 1 offers under no insurance). OLS 
analysis; Student’s t-statistics in brackets. * denotes significance at 5% 





































2  0.031 0.013 0.126 0.141 
Source: ‘insurance games’ 27/8/03 and 28/8/03 (for rubric see Appendix) 
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4.  Trust and association measures of social capital: potential policy 
implications 
 
It is now necessary to consider the link between the trust definition of social 
capital and the associational definition. Figure 3 illustrates a simple picture of 
the two-way interaction between these concepts.  How far association within 
organisations breeds trust depends on the evaluation which association 
members make of that organisation, and in particular of its leadership. But it 
also, on the evidence of the table above, appears to depend on income and 
assets. Meanwhile there is a feedback in the opposite direction from trust to 
association: people who trust one another more have a predisposition to form 
associations. The a priori influence of income is ambiguous: richer people are 
freer to invest their cash resources in associations with trusted people, but 
against this, partnerships formed in adversity generate strong bonding social 
capital.  
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We now  (Table  7) estimate this two-way relationship, by OLS and 
instrumental-variables methods. ‘Association’ is measured as an average of 
‘bonding social capital’ (membership of affinity groups whose membership is 
concentrated within the village), ‘bridging social capital’ (membership of 
associations extending beyond the village) and ‘linking social capital’ ( social 
or professional linkages with government officials, NGOs and private 
companies). The strength of experimentally obtained data in their ability to 
facilitate a one-way analysis of the influence of otherwise endogenous but 
with respect to behaviour in the laboratory pre-determined and therefore 
practically exogenous variables (such as association) is also a weakness 
when one is interested in the formation of such variables.  For ‘trust’ there are 
therefore two kinds of estimate – a straightforward World Values Survey- type 
question about the extent to which the respondent trusts individuals within the 
community, and also the measure derived from our ‘trust game’ . We shall call 
these, respectively, the experimental and the questionnaire-based  indicators. 
In the ‘trust to association’ relationship, we observe a fairly orthodox 
positive influence of risk efficacy (assets) on associational membership for a 
given level of trust - in defiance of the Narayan and Pritchett view, quoted 
above, that social capital uni-directionally determines income and 
expenditure; no other variables are significant. In the relationship running in 
the opposite direction, the story becomes more complex.  Risk efficacy is 
always a positive influence, robust to variations in the trust measure and the 
estimation procedure used. So is the evaluation of the effectiveness of group 
organisation and leadership: if these are ranked highly, trust increases, and if 
they slacken, trust falls away. Other influences vary according to the type of 
trust indicator selected. Female education (not male) is an important positive 
influence on the experimental indicator, but loses significance completely in 
relation to the questionnaire-based indicator. Intragroup equality, by contrast, 
is a significant positive influence in relation to the questionnaire-based 
indicator, but insignificant in relation to the  experimental indicator. Perhaps 
most intriguing of all, the questionnaire indicator of trust is strongly responsive 
to what we call the ‘trust gap’ – the difference between the degree of trust 
evinced between ‘members of one’s immediate community’ – typically the 
village – and ‘Ugandans as a whole’. The higher this gap, the greater the rate 
at which associational membership converts into trust. In other words, trust 
within the communities of Sironko and Bufumbo is fed by distrust of Ugandans 
as a whole; trust, on this view, is not a homogeneous asset which can be 
infinitely extended, but rather a positional good which thrives through distrust 
of others – and potentially by creating distrust of others. This is not a new 
insight – it has been developed in relation to the Sicilian Mafia, for example, 
by Diego Gambetta
8 – but it has important implications for those wishing to 




                                                 
8 ‘It is by offering trust in conjunction with discouraging competition that the mafioso ends up selling 
trust as… a good that one seller can consume only of other sellers do not. And this is why competition 
develops in harmful ways.. by throttling the market rather than letting it work freely’. Gambetta 1988, 
p. 172.   20
Table 7. Uganda sample: estimates of the two-way relationship, using 
alternative concepts of trust 
 
Relation (1) (trust to association) 
 
Dependent variable: composite social capital (a mixture of 
bonding, bridging and linking associational memberships) 
 



















female education  0.032 
(0.004) 
 
trust in affinity group  0.003 
(1.95) 
 
‘trust gap’ between affinity group 





2  0.207 0.105 
 
Relation (2) (association to trust) 
 
  Measure of trust (dependent variable)  
Trust in affinity group 
First player offer in 
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(0.74)   21
Equality 
R




                Some tentative policy implications thus begin to appear from the 
quantitative evidence so far.  Levels of trust are responsive to higher levels of 
female education,  better-functioning institutions and higher levels of 
intragroup equality, as well as (controversially and not yet robustly 
demonstrated) through creating suspicion of others.  It may not be possible to 
create experiential trust
9 through a market process, but it appears to be 
possible to create it by creating institutions in which members have 
confidence, as well as by  institutional developments which have a bearing on 
education and on perceptions of  equality. 
   However, other mechanisms are important. External agents can 
influence experiential trust only indirectly, but they can create incentivised 
trust if they are able to design incentives which reduce the costs of being 
exploited. As we have already discovered , this is not a simple mechanical 
process. In our experimental ‘insurance game’ , we showed that there exists a 
substantial demand for insurance in Sironko and Bufumbo, but that insurance 
elicits higher levels of trust only within the higher-income village, and that the 
‘effectiveness’ of insurance in general is positively associated with income 
and negatively with social capital. Mosley et al. (2003), in Chapter 4, show 
that all kinds of benefits for lower income groups can be extracted from 
microinsurance, many of them in the form of externalities; but getting these 
benefits to materialise does not appear to be easy. What can be done? 
  In Table 8 we examine the influence of particular potential policy 
handles on our measure of the effectiveness of insurance. The dependent 
variable, as in Table 7 is the offer (the degree of revealed trust) of player 1 in 
the insurance game, less the mean of player 1 offers under the situation of no 
insurance. The effectiveness of insurance, in this sense, is responsive to 
female (but not male) education, microfinance membership and (without 
statistical significance) to extension contact. The apparent lesson from this is 
once again that complementarities matter in determining the effectiveness of 




                                                 
9 From here onward: ‘experiential trust’ = trust which is created by interactions between people, 
‘incentivised trust’ = trust which is created by devices or institutions which reduce the loss resulting 
from misplacing trust (Mosley et al 2003, Ch.3) . Insurance is, in principle, an example of an institution 
capable of creating incentivised trust.   22
 
 









Dependent variable: ‘insurance effectiveness’ (player 1 offer under 
insurance, less mean of player 1 offers under no insurance). OLS 
analysis; Student’s t-statistics in brackets. * denotes significance at 5% 



















































2  0.282 0.126  0.141 
Number of 
observations 
34 34  34 
Source: ‘insurance games’ 27/8/03 and 28/8/03 (for rubric see Appendix) 
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               Thus, trust cannot be bought, but it can be created by factors other 
than ‘social history’, under certain circumstances. Firstly, it appears, in some 
experiments and very unrobustly, to respond to increased well-being (as well 
as the other way about). But secondly, the trust which people place in others 
ought in principle to be increased by reducing the costs which result if that 
trust is abused or exploited – which insurance does, if properly implemented. 
Using experimental methods we find that the offer of insurance may indeed 
have this effect, but it is not certain to. It will only elicit higher trust, it seems, if 
certain complementary factors are present – the most important of which 
appear to be education and membership of microfinance groups; what makes 
insurance work is not only how it is designed but whether it is ‘joined up’ with 
other characteristics. These are mere statistical correlations: additional 
research is needed particularly to assess what the chemistry is which causes 
trust to be built on when these catalysts are present. 
   24
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Appendix. Instructions for the ‘insurance game’ 
(NB: to visualise the original ‘trust game’, simply omit the portions in bold. The rubric for the 
original trust game is deliberately as close as possible to that used by Abigail Barr and 
Michael Shambare in Zimbabwe (see Barr 2003), and we are grateful to Dr Barr for the use of 
her field notes.) 
 
Note to researchers – Players 1 and 2 once selected should be separated in 
two rooms/locations before you begin this game. The risk of collusion is 
greater due to the tripling effect which makes this worth while. First instruct 
the player 1’s in a group, then take all of their offers. Ask them to wait while 





Thank you all for taking the time to come today. This game may take up to an 
hour, so if you think you will not be able to stay that long without leaving 
please let us know now. Before we begin I want to make some general 
comments about what we are doing here today and explain some rules that 
we need to follow. We will be playing a game for real money that you will take 
home. You should understand that this is not our own money. It is money 
given to me by my university/ the University of Sheffield in England to do a 
research study. This is research – which will eventually be part of a book; it is 
not part of a development project of any sort. Before we proceed any further, 
let me stress: if at any point you decide you do not wish to participate in the 
game for any reason, you are of course free to leave whether we have started 
the game or not.  
 
If you have heard about a game that has been played here in the past you 
should try to forget everything that you have been told. This is a completely 
different game. We are about to begin. Please listen as carefully as possible, 
because only people who understand the game will actually be able to play it. 
I will run through some examples here while we are all together. You cannot 
ask questions of one another or talk about the game while we are here 
together. This is very important and please make sure that you obey this rule, 
because it is possible for one person to spoil the game for everyone, in which 
case we would not be able to play the game today. So not worry if you do not 
completely understand the game as we go through the examples here in the 
group. Each of you will have a chance to ask questions in private with 
(me/Paul) to be sure that you understand how to play. 
 
Insurance game instructions 
 
The game is played by pairs of individuals. Each pair is made up of a Player 1 
and a Player 2. Each of you will play this game with someone from your own 
village. However, none of you will know exactly with whom you are playing.   27
Only (Sarah)
10 knows who is to play with whom and she will never tell anyone 
else. 
 
Sarah will give Sh 4000 to each Player 1 and another Sh4000 to each Player 
2. They could give Sh 4000, or 3000, or 2000, or 1000, or nothing. Whatever 
amount Player 1 decides to give to Player 2 will be tripled by Sarah before it is 
passed on to Player 2. Player 2 then has the option of returning any portion of 
this tripled amount to Player 1. To protect her/himself against the possibility 
that the money will not come back, Player 1’s are allowed to pay an insurance 
premium of Sh1000 to us if they decide to make a payment to Player 2,and if 
that payment does not come back, we will refund that payment, net of the 
premium. Then the game is over. 
 
 
Player 1 goes home with whatever he or she kept from their original Sh4000, 
plus anything returned to them by Player 2, plus any payouts from the 
insurance fund, less any insurance premium paid. Player 2 goes home with 
their original Sh4000, plus whatever was given to them by Player 1 and then 
tripled by Sarah, minus whatever they returned to Player 1. 
 
Here are some examples (you should work through these examples by having 
all the possibilities laid out in front of people, with Player 1’s options from 
Sh4000  to 0  and a second column showing the effects of the tripling. As you 
go through each example demonstrate visually what happens to the final 
outcomes for each player. Be careful to remind people that Player 2 always 
also has the original Sh4000): 
 
1.  Imagine that Player 1 gives his entire Sh4000 to Player 2. He does not 
take out insurance (he cannot – he has given everything to Player 
2) Sarah triples this amount, so Player 2 gets Sh12000 (3 times 
Sh4000) over and above their initial Sh 4000. At this point Player 1 has 
nothing and Player 2 has Sh16000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh 3000 to Player 1. At the 
end of the game Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 will 
go home with Sh13000. 
2.  Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to 
Player 2. He also pays an insurance premium of Sh1000. Sarah 
triples the Sh3000 which is handed over, so  Player 2 gets Sh9000 (3 
times Sh3000 equals Sh9000) over and above their original Sh4000. At 
this point, Player 1 has nothing and Player 2 has Sh13000. Then 
                                                 
10 Sarah Khanakwa, the excellent survey coordinator.   28
Player 2 has to decide whether they wish to give anything back to 
Player 1, and if so how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return 
nothing to Player 1. Player 2 claims on his insurance policy, getting 
back the Sh3000 he paid over. At the end of the game Player 1 will 
go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh13000. 
(Note: Player 1’s gain from being insured is Sh2000, compare the 
corresponding example from the trust game) 
3.  Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh2000 to 
Player 2. He pays an insurance premium of Sh1000. Sarah triples 
this amount, So Player 2 gets Sh 6000 (3 times 2000 equals 6000) 
over and above their original Sh 4000. At this point, Player 1 has 
Sh1000 and Player 2 has Sh 10000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh3000 to Player 1. This is 
more than the amount paid over to player 2, so the insurance 
company does not pay up.  At the end of the game Player 1 will go 
home with Sh5000 and player 2 will go home with Sh7000. 
(Loss from being insured (gain to insurance company)- Sh 1000) 
4.  Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh 1000 to 
player 2. He does not take out insurance. Sarah triples this amount, 
so Player 2 gets Sh3000 (3 times Sh1000 equals Sh3000) over and 
above their initial Sh4000. At this point, Player 1 has Sh3000 and 
Player 2 has Sh7000. Then player 2 has to decide whether they wish to 
give anything back to Player 1,and if so, how much. Suppose Player 2 
decides to return Sh2000 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 1 
will go home with Sh 5000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh5000.  
5.  How let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives nothing to 
Player 2. There is nothing for Sarah to triple. Player 2 has nothing to 
give back and the game ends there. Player 2 goes home with Sh4000 
and Player 2 goes home with Sh4000. 
 
Note that the larger the amount that Player 1 gives to Player 2, the greater the 
amount that can be taken away by the two players together. However, it is 
entirely up to Player 2 to decide what he should give back to Player 1. The 
first player could end up with more than Sh4000 or less than Sh4000 as a 
result. In this version of the game, s/he can protect herself against 
‘exploitation’ by taking out an insurance policy. But there are limits to 
what an insurance policy will protect – if the second player returns 
nothing, the first player’s maximum take-home pay is only Sh3000, 
against the Sh4000 with which s/he started.  
   29
We will go through more examples with each of you individually when you 
come to play the game. In the meantime, do not talk to anyone about the 
game. Even if you are not sure that you understand the game, do not talk to 
anyone about it. This is important. If you talk to anyone about the game while 
you are waiting to play, we must disqualify you from playing. 
 
 
[Bring in each Player 1 one by one. Use as many of the examples below as 
necessary.] 
 
6.  Imagine that Player 1 gives his entire Sh4000 to Player 2. Sarah triples 
this amount, so Player 2 gets Sh12000 (3 times Sh4000) over and 
above their initial Sh 4000. At this point Player 1 has nothing and 
Player 2 has Sh16000. Then Player 2 has to decide whether they wish 
to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how much. Suppose Player 
2 decides to return Sh 6000 to Player 1. At the end of the game Player 
1 will go home with Sh6000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh10000. 
7.  Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to 
Player 2. He pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
this amount, so  Player 2 gets Sh9000 (3 times Sh3000 equals 
Sh9000) over and above their original Sh4000. At this point, Player 1 
has nothing and Player 2 has Sh13000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh1000 to Player 1. This is 
less than the Sh3000 he handed over, so the ‘insurance policy’ 
pays out the shortfall of  Sh2000.  At the end of the game, 
therefore, Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 will go 
home with Sh12000. 
Gain from insurance - 1000 
8.  Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh2000 to 
Player 2, and pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
the Sh 2000 paid over, So Player 2 gets Sh 6000 (3 times 2000 equals 
6000) over and above their original Sh 4000. At this point, Player 1 has 
Sh1000 and Player 2 has Sh 10000. Then Player 2 has to decide 
whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how 
much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return nothing to Player 1. Player 
1 claims Sh2000 on his insurance policy. At the end of the game 
Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and player 2 will go home with 
Sh10000. 
Gain from insurance - 1000   30
9.  Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh 1000 to 
player 2. He pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
the Sh 1000 handed over, so Player 2 gets Sh3000 (3 times Sh1000 
equals Sh3000) over and above their initial Sh4000. At this point, 
Player 1 has Sh3000 and Player 2 has Sh7000. Then player 2 has to 
decide whether they wish to give anything back to Player 1,and if so, 
how much. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh2000 to Player 1. 
This is more than the amount handed over, so the insurance 
policy does not pay out. At the end of the game Player 1 will go 
home with Sh 5000 and Player 2 will go home with Sh5000. 
Loss from insurance(gain to insurance company) - 1000 
10. How let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives nothing to 
Player 2. There is nothing for Sarah to triple. Player 2 has nothing to 
give back and the game ends there. Player 2 goes home with Sh4000 
and Player 2 goes home with Sh4000. 
 
Now can you work through these examples for me: 
 
11. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to Player 2. So, Player 2 gets Sh 
9000 (3 times Sh3000 equals Sh9000) over and above their initial 
Sh4000.  Player 1 also takes out an insurance policy, costing him 
Sh1000. At this point, Player 1, therefore has nothing and Player 2 has 
Sh13000. Suppose Player 2 decides to return Sh5000 to Player 1. At 
the end of the game Player 1 will have how much? [the initial Sh4000 
,less Sh3000(given to Player 2)=Sh 1000 plus return from player 2 of 
Sh5000, less Sh 1000 insurance policy=Sh5000. If they are finding it 
difficult, talk through the maths with them, demonstrating with the 
actual money]. And Player 2 will have how much? [Their original Sh 
4000 plus Sh 9000 after the tripling less Sh5000 which they return to 
Player 1= Sh8000.] And how much does the insurance policy pay 
out? – [nothing, because player 2 gets back more than the amount 
he paid in.] 
 
12. Now let’s try another example. Imagine that Player 1 gives Sh3000 to 
Player 2. He pays Sh 1000 as an insurance premium. Sarah triples 
this amount, so  Player 2 gets Sh9000 (3 times Sh3000 equals 
Sh9000) over and above their original Sh4000. At this point, what do 
the two players have? ([Player 1 has nothing, because the Sh1000 
which remains to him has to be paid out as an insurance premium,  
and Player 2 has Sh13000]. Then Player 2 has to decide whether they 
wish to give anything back to Player 1, and if so how much. Suppose 
Player 2 decides to return nothing to Player 1. What will the insurance 
policy pay out? [It will pay out the original stake of Sh3000]  At the end   31
of the game, therefore, Player 1 will go home with Sh3000 and Player 2 
will go home with Sh12000. 
 
 
Gain from insurance – Sh2000 
 
After this ‘training’ play the game with the first player as follows: 
You are Player 1. Here is your $4. [At this point Sh 4000 is placed on the table 
in front of the player.] While I am turned away, you must hand [the Professor] 
the amount of money you want to be tripled and passed on to Player 2. You 
can give Player 2 nothing, Sh1000, Sh2000, Sh3000 or Sh4000. You can 
also decide, if you wish, to take out an insurance policy. If you decide to 
do this, you pay a premium of Sh 1000 and you get back any money 
which you hand over and do not receive in return – less the premium.  
Player 2 will receive the amount which you hand over tripled by me plus their 
own initial Sh4000. Remember that the more you give to Player 2 the greater 
the amount of money at his or her disposal. While Player 2 is under no 
obligation to give anything back, we will pass on to you whatever he or she 
decides to return.[Now the player hands over whatever he or she wants to 
have tripled, and his insurance premium if he decides to take one out, 
and the tripled amount is passed to player 2] 
 
[Note to researcher: Finish off all Player 1’s and send them to a third holding 
location – they must not return to the group of Player 1’s who have not played 
and they must not join the Player 2’s.Once all Player 1’s have played you can 
begin to call Player 2’s. Player 2’s can be paid off immediately after they play 
and sent home.] 
 
 
After dealing with ALL the first players, deal with the second players as 
follows: 
 
You are Player 2. First, here is your Sh4000. [Put the Sh4000 in front of 
Player 2.] Let’s put that to one side.[Move the Sh4000 to one side but leave it 
on the table.] This pile represents Player 1’s initial Sh 4000.[Put this Sh 4000 
in front of the researcher.] Now I will show you how much Player 1 decided to 
give to you. Then I will triple it. Then you must hand back the amount that you 
want returned to Player 1. [Take Player 1’s offer out of the pile representing 
Player 1’s stake and put it down in front of Player 2, near but not on top of   32
Player 2’s Sh4000. Then add to Player 1’s offer to get the tripled amount. 
Receive back Player 2’s response.] Remember, you can choose to give 
something back or not. Do what you wish. While I am turned away, you must 
hand [the professor] the amount of money you want to send back to Player 1. 
[Now the player hands back his return for Player 1]. You are now free to go 
home, but do not visit with any of the waiting players. 